

# THE GERMAN MENACE TO RUSSIA

**T**HE GERMAN military maneuvers have aroused the attention of Europe to the splendid equipment and administration of the Army, not only in its fighting spirit, but in its commissariat and its medical service. We read in the foreign papers that the English maneuvers have fallen short in the last two particulars, that men left the ranks faint and overspent for want of food and drink. The efficiency of Germany in managing a large mass of men marshaled in fighting order is calling out the admiration of Europe. It is even spreading alarm. The Russian press regard with considerable uneasiness what the *Novoye Vremya* styles "a new eruption of German militarism." This newspaper, commenting upon Germany's increase of armament, says:

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"The grave period which Europe is living through has already borne fruit. Germany has announced the coming new increase of her military forces. And the increase, it appears, will be enormous. Of course, the new project has caused alarm almost all over Europe: one such law is sufficient to change considerably the existing balance in Europe."

Stating that, according to the new project, the German Army will number 865,000 before 1918, possibly in 1914, it goes on:

"There is no need to insist that this fact will have an immense political significance. Why, the German Army . . . will, in time of peace, exceed the French Army to the extent of one-third. Militarism is a terrible thing. Germany forces Europe to make new, unheard-of additions to their armies. May she not have to regret it!"

But while condemning Germany, the *Novoye Vremya* urges France to increase her Army, and indorses the law for three-year military service. To quote again:

"The Franco-Russian Alliance pursues a defensive policy. From this point of view the allied armies must coordinate their work in time of peace, so that when the hour of trial arrives the mutual defense should prove effective. Under the present conditions the French Army, with all its high qualities, is hardly equal to the task which may fall to its share.

"The Russian Army, owing to the enormous distances of our country, is mobilized very slowly. Therefore in case of a sudden attack the first weeks of the war will be spent in concentrating the reserves and transporting them to their respective quarters. . . . The Central-European armies—our probable adversaries—will take advantage of this period of our enforced inactivity, rush their forces against our ally, crush his advance posts, occupy as much territory as possible, and thus prevent the French mobilization. . . .

"For political, social, and psychological reasons neither Russia nor France will, under any circumstances whatever, it seems, be the first to start war. The war, if it ever comes to a war, will be started by the Central European States, which have not lost their fighting instincts. It will begin suddenly, without warning, for only taking the Dual Alliance unawares can they expect to overpower it. France will have to withstand the first assault with her Army on a peace footing. And wo to her if she shall not hold out! To increase her Army in time of peace is a problem of gravest importance. France can count on the powerful assistance of Russia, but it rests with herself to have that assistance come in time. What consolation will she find in Russian victories if, owing to her improvidence, she lets the enemy penetrate into the heart of the country, if her cities and villages are burned, fields, vineyards, and forests destroyed, the population disarmed? On the other hand, what use shall we have from the alliance with

France if our ally shall not be able to check our common adversaries long enough for the complete mobilization and concentration of our forces?

"Having come out victorious in a struggle with a score of tongues a hundred years ago, we shall be able to overpower, without outside help, two nations if they venture to go in the path of the great Napoleon. But our alliance with France has another import. If she will do her plain duty in time of peace, war will become impossible, for the very simple reason that the Central European Governments will not decide upon an attack which does not promise any successes even in case of its suddenness.

"The introduction of a three-year military service in France will increase the numbers and strengthen the fighting qualities of the first line of defense upon the reliability of which the safety of France and the speedy and successful outcome of a possible war will depend."—*Translation made for THE LITERARY DIGEST.*