

He Gave a Name to **THE WORLD'S MOST HORRIBLE CRIME**

Raphael Lemkin called it
"genocide"



By HERBERT YAHRAES

ONE of the longest and most dramatic one-man crusades in history has just drawn to a successful climax with most Americans still unaware of its existence.

At a recent Washington dinner party, the hostess mentioned the tragic case of the 28,000 Greek youngsters snatched from their homes and carried off to live in Communist-dominated lands. "It's good to know," she sighed, "that anything like that would now come under the genocide convention."

"Genocide?" asked a guest. "What's that? Birth control?"

"Race suicide, isn't it?" put in another. Of the dozen well-informed persons around the table, only four knew what the word genocide meant and only two had ever heard of the genocide convention.

Yet this convention, or treaty, is potentially the most important achievement of the United Nations to date. For the first time, it stamps as an international crime what the Nazis did to the Jews, the Turks to the Armenians, and the Romans to the early Christians. For the first time, it offers the world a legal means of preventing and punishing this crime—genocide, the extermination of a national, racial, or religious group.

Unanimously passed by the UN General Assembly in December, 1948, the genocide convention went into full force this January 12th, 90 days after it had been ratified by more than 20 nations—the number required to make it international law. Notable among the nonratifiers is the United States; the treaty is still before the Senate, where ratification has been powerfully opposed by the American Bar Association, which favors a genocide convention but seeks changes in the treaty now proposed.

The story of the genocide treaty is the story of one of the world's most persistent men—a tall, graying, forty-nine-year-old Polish-born scholar, Raphael Lemkin, who lost 49 relatives to the barbarity he had set out years before to outlaw.

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It was Lemkin—now visiting professor of international law at Yale—who conceived the idea of declaring this barbarity a crime. He also gave it a name—after it had gone nameless throughout history—and then led the campaign for UN action on it.

Although the dictionary definition of Lemkin's word, genocide, restricts it to extermination of a national or racial group, the treaty he helped draft applies it also to religious and cultural groups, and outlaws attempts to exterminate these groups not only by killing their members but also by causing them serious harm, preventing births, or forcibly removing their children.

To scoffers who say the genocide convention will turn out to be just another "scrap of paper," its proponents offer quick rebuttal. They point out that the treaty makes each ratifying country responsible for acts of genocide committed within its borders; but gives other ratifiers the means to see that this responsibility is exercised.

Each ratifier is required to pass legislation punishing not only genocide but conspiracy, incitement and attempts to commit genocide. The nature of the punishment is left to each country—although the treaty's proponents say the effective penalty is death. To constitute genocide, the crime would have to involve the killing or persecution of a "substantial" number of people. The accused genocidist would be tried by the regular prosecuting officials in the regular courts of the land where the crime was committed. The treaty, however, leaves the way open for setting up an international tribunal for genocide cases. The treaty is directed not against nations but persons; if the nation itself were involved in the charge, the head of the nation and certain public officials would be responsible.

Should Country X dispute the fact that the crime within its borders was genocide, any other ratifying nation could bring the case before the International Court of Justice at The Hague. If Country X failed to take any action at all, or refused to recognize the findings of The Hague court, the ratifying nations would then call on the UN to act. The UN would decide in each case what action was needed, perhaps an international investigation resulting in economic and military pressure against the offending nation.

One authority on the treaty says: "Maybe some genocidists will go unpunished just as some murderers do. But you wouldn't throw out the laws against homicide just because some homicidists get away with their crime. There may be bugs in this first international law against genocide; if so, we'll certainly work to remove them as we find them. The important thing is that for the first time the treaty gives the world a way to take a stand against genocide.

"Had the treaty been in force when Hitler started persecuting Jews, nobody supposes that Germany would have tried the Fuehrer or turned him over to an international court. But a quick, united and official world-wide stand might have stopped him, for he was still relatively weak, still dependent on foreign trade and capital."

His First Approach to the Problem

Lemkin, the second of three sons of a moderately well-to-do farmer, began life in a tiny village in eastern Poland. He ran into his first case of genocide, at the age of twelve, in the novel *Quo Vadis*, by the Pole, Henryk Sienkiewicz. Young Raphael confronted his mother. "When the Roman emperor made the animals kill the early Christians," he asked, "it was a bad thing, wasn't it?"

"Yes," she replied, "very bad."

"And all those other people—they just sat around in the amphitheater and clapped!"

"That was very bad, too."

"Today we don't do things like that. When people kill people today, they get put in jail, don't they?"

"Yes," she hesitantly agreed. "today they get put in jail."

In other books Raphael read of Carthage, utterly destroyed; of the 10,000,000 people wiped out by the Mongols; of the 50,000 Protestants murdered in France; of the 30,000 Catholics tortured and killed in Japan. After that, he and his mother had many discussions. "To kill defenseless people just because they are different from you—is there no law?"

"There are laws against murder."

"They do not seem to be any good," the boy observed, "against massacres."

In 1920, Lemkin enrolled at the University of Lvov. He hoped to become a philologist, a student of language, because he wanted to try to understand why in every age people of one culture tried to wipe

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out people of another. At the root of every culture, of course, was language. Already familiar with Polish, Russian, French, German and Italian, he now plunged into Arabic, Hebrew and Sanskrit.

But one day in 1921 in Berlin, a young Armenian named Teilierian walked up to a Turk named Talaat Pasha, whipped out a revolver, and fired. "That," said the Armenian as the Turk fell dead, "is for my mother." He gave himself up and was tried for murder.

Reading about the case, Lemkin was tremendously moved.

Teilierian's mother had been one of the 1,200,000 Armenians massacred by the Turks in 1915, when Talaat headed Turkey's police forces. The boy had survived only because his mother's body had fallen on and hidden him. Lemkin said to a professor at Lvov, "The Armenian did try to have the Turk arrested for the massacre?"

The professor replied, "There wasn't any law under which he could be arrested."

"Not even though he had had a part in killing so many people?"

"Let us take the case of a man who owns some chickens," the professor said. "He kills them. Why not? It is not your business. If you interfere, it is trespass."

"The Armenians," Lemkin pointed out, "were not chickens."

The professor let that go. "When you interfere with the internal affairs of a country," he remarked, "you infringe upon that country's sovereignty."

"So it is a crime for Teilierian to strike down one man. But it was not a crime for that man to have struck down one million men?"

The professor shrugged. "You are young and excited," he said. "You put matters too badly. If you knew something about international law—"

In Berlin the Armenian argued that he had acted under moral compulsion. The court set him free—on the ground he had been insane. To Lemkin, that was the cream of the jest. He dropped some of his philological studies to study law.

In 1929, Lemkin was named Warsaw's public prosecutor, a job like that of district attorney in an American city. "I need now to learn at firsthand how laws operate," he told his mother. "Then maybe I can do something about them."

"It is moral power that counts," she said.

"But sometimes the law can make it count more."

Lemkin brought a concept to his work that was new to Poland. He argued that penal law must be shaped and administered not so much to punish the individual as to protect society. He wrote a book on the rehabilitation of criminals, and other books analyzing the legal codes of other countries. The Lemkin writings influenced Poland's new penal code, approved in 1932, but at the back of his mind a bigger idea simmered.

In October, 1933, at the Fifth International Conference for the Unification of Penal Law, held in Madrid under the auspices of the League of Nations with the legal lights of 37 countries present, Lemkin proposed to add to the list of such international crimes as piracy, slavery and traffic in drugs a new one which he called *the crime of barbarity*—"destruction of national, religious or racial groups." The old arguments arose about interfering with somebody else's business, and his proposal was pigeonholed.

Back in Warsaw, which was jittery about Hitler, he ran into trouble. He had failed to check with the Foreign Office about his Madrid proposal. Government-inspired newspapers attacked him as an idealist and fool. Lemkin resigned his public post and engaged in private practice and the teaching of law.

But his mind continued to run on one track. As fast as he got a fee, he spent it writing about "the crime of barbarity," speechmaking, and traveling to every international law conference at which he saw a chance to present his ideas—to Budapest, Copenhagen, Paris, Amsterdam, Cairo.

Vishinsky Suspects Capitalist Plot

Once, open hostility to his idea was expressed in a Russian pamphlet called *Counterrevolutionary Intervention Through Criminal Law*, foreword by Andrei Vishinsky. By proposing to make the crime of barbarity punishable under international law, Vishinsky wrote, Lemkin was plainly preparing the way for the capitalistic world to intervene in the affairs of the Soviet Union.

By and large, though, the international lawyers were politely bored. With the Nazi invasion of Poland in 1939, Lemkin took refuge with hundreds of other Poles in a vast forest. There he saw the Germans bomb a refugee train drawn up at a nearby village. Several hundred children who had packed the train had tumbled out and were eating

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breakfast. Telling about it, Lemkin rubs his hand nervously over the arm of his chair. "Then the planes came over," he says quietly, "and destroyed them." He looks up. "Is it any wonder I couldn't forget my idea?"

Some months later Lemkin set out for Vilnyus, in what is now Russian territory, in a cart driven by an elderly peasant. When he reached Vilnyus after a month's trip, Lemkin had a beard that reached to his chest, and enough money to send two telegrams. One went to an acquaintance in Sweden, the Minister of Justice, who wired money for him to get to Stockholm. The other went to his Paris publishers, inquiring about a manuscript he had mailed them seven days before the war.

Lemkin arrived in Stockholm in February, 1940, and the book—which had been suggested by the Bank of International Settlements—was published a few months before the Germans took Paris. It won him an invitation to lecture at the University of Stockholm—to accept it he learned Swedish in five months—and the following spring a similar invitation from Duke University, at Durham, North Carolina.

Lemkin was scheduled to lecture at Duke on international currency transactions, but he soon branched out to discuss Nazi-occupied Europe. In Stockholm, with the help of the Swedish government, he had begun collecting German documents relating to the rule of conquered peoples. He soon had evidence that a great *(Continued on page 56)*

new wave of barbarism was rolling up.

The War Department sent a colonel to Duke to listen in, and soon there came other jobs for the refugee scholar—teacher at the School of Military Government at the University of Virginia, chief consultant to the Board of Economic Warfare and the Foreign Economic Administration, and finally adviser on foreign affairs to the War Department, where he helped plan for the Nuremberg trials.

The lectures and supporting documents grew into a massive volume called *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*. Published in 1944, it gave a detailed picture of how the Nazis were organizing Europe. The word genocide appeared for the first time in this book. Lemkin had coined it after hearing Winston Churchill on the radio, speaking of Nazi atrocities, refer to *this crime without a name*.

That worried Lemkin, for you can't legislate against a thing that's nameless. He himself, back in '33, had dubbed it the crime of barbarity, but *barbarity* wasn't sufficiently precise. He talked to friends. One suggested *mass murder*. But Lemkin pointed out that when a man comes home drunk and kills his wife, mother-in-law and seven children, that's mass murder, too, but not the kind Lemkin had in mind.

Right Word Proves Elusive

Somebody suggested "race murder." The nameless crime, though, was directed not only against races but also against religions, cultures, nations.

Lemkin decided that a new word would have to be coined. Rereading Plato, he found it in the Greek *genos*—clan or religious group. To this he married the Latin *cide*, or killing.

By this time Lemkin had a personal interest in getting genocide acknowledged as an international crime. In June of 1941 he had received a letter from his parents, written a few days after the German armies had crossed the Russian frontier. Instead of the usual happy account of family affairs, this was short.

"We are well," it said. "We hope you are happy. We are thinking of you." He never heard from them again.

After the war, Lemkin found his brother, Elias, and Elias' wife and two children in Berlin. They could tell him nothing except that the Russians had moved them to a factory town beyond the Urals, leaving the elder Lemkins on the farm, and that now the farm was gone, and the village, and everyone who had lived there.

"And the rest of your family?" an acquaintance asked Lemkin recently.

"I have no family," he said bitterly.

"But there were uncles, aunts, cousins?"

"Yes. Altogether there were 49, counting my mother and my father."

"And you don't know what happened?"

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"If you mean, do I know which went into the German gas chambers, and which the Germans starved in the ghettos, and which the Germans shot or beat or worked to death someplace else," said Lemkin, "no, I don't know that."

When Lemkin went to the Nuremberg trials with Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, chief American prosecutor, he was eager to make genocide part of the indictment of the trials. It got into the indictment—against Goering, Streicher, Von Neurath and all the other leading Nazis and organizations.

During the trial, in the summer of 1946, Lemkin flew to England to attend an international legal conference at Cambridge, urging it to adopt a resolution against genocide. Delegates told him he was trying to push international law into a field where it didn't belong. "But piracy," he retorted, "is an international crime, and nations with their culture are more important than a ship and its cargo. Surely Shakespeare is more precious than cotton." The convention took no action.

He decided to stop off in Paris, where the first World War II peace conference was being held. Maybe he could get the conferees to mention the crime in the treaties. "Good heavens, man," said an American, "don't you read the papers? Don't you know we're having a devil of a time with the Russians as it is, without dragging in another issue?"

"As a man," said a French conferee, "I'm all for your idea. But as a diplomat, how can I bring it up? It's not on the agenda, you see."

"Highly interesting," said an Ethiopian, "but what can we do? We're too small."

Heartsick and weary, Lemkin hurried from delegate to delegate. The story was always the same: Everybody was against genocide, but—

On the morning of his third day in Paris, too ill to get up, he was taken to the American Military Hospital.

A few days later, on September 30th, came the verdict of the International Military Tribunal. The judges had thrown out crimes against humanity committed before the war. Lemkin was right back where he had started.

Then, one sleepless night, he turned on the radio and heard that in New York the agenda for the first regular session of the UN was being drawn up. The session would open in three weeks.

Lemkin arrived in New York in mid-October and went directly to Lake Success. He had set himself an enormous task. On the boat coming over he had drafted a resolution declaring genocide an international crime. But it would have to be sponsored by an official delegation, and he knew hardly anyone. He had just five days before the agenda closed. Five days—and he had been trying to sell his idea for 13 years.

The United States delegation gave him to understand it would support the resolution if Lemkin would get someone else to sponsor it. The British, though less enthusiastic, gave him a similar answer; and the French.

Lemkin decided to switch tactics. Instead of looking for a big power, he would try to interest a small one—but one that could swing a lot of votes.

On the second day he recognized Dr. Ricardo Alfaro, authority on international law and former President of Panama. Lemkin introduced himself and handed Alfaro a copy of the proposed resolution. "Large countries can defend themselves by arms," Lemkin reminded him. "Small countries need the protection of laws." The next day the Panamanian smilingly handed him the resolution—signed.

Two and a half days to go. Lemkin told his story to the Cuban delegates. "For an idea of how important genocide can be," he said, "consider this: More Jews were destroyed by genocide than there are people in all of Cuba." The Cuban delegation signed.

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Lemkin thought the resolution would be more likely to pass if its sponsors included an Asiatic nation. He wangled an introduction to Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, sister of Nehru, head of the new all-Indian government. Mrs. Pandit referred him to an Indian judge, who agreed that action against genocide was in the Indian tradition. Mrs. Pandit added her country's endorsement to those of Panama and Cuba.

On the fifth and last day, Lemkin filed the resolution in the office of UN Secretary General Trygve Lie, and hurried off to Washington, where at the War Department's war crimes office he asked for and got two months' leave—without pay—to push his crusade in the UN.

His \$8,000 government salary had enabled him to live at Washington's Wardman Park Hotel. Now he returned to New York and took a shabby \$25-a-month room up near 102d Street in Manhattan. He hung around the press room at Lake Success, prowled the corridors, and within a few weeks was on speaking terms with almost every delegate.

Evenings he spent in the library, digging out historical material for the statements he drafted for 30 countries. The one he handed to a Peruvian delegate declared that Peru historically stood for religious freedom and tolerance of minorities. For a Czech delegate, he described how his country had been destroyed by oppression during the Middle Ages. For the French, Lemkin referred to the French Revolution and quoted Voltaire: "A day will come when out of these crimes a great benefit will come to humanity."

Russia worried him, for he hoped for unanimous action by the UN, but could not forget Vishinsky's attack on the crime of barbarity idea back in 1935, and Russia's UN delegate, Gromyko, had initially opposed including the genocide matter on the Assembly agenda. So Lemkin went to Jan Masaryk, the Czech Foreign Minister.

"As a student I knew your father," Lemkin told him, referring to old Thomas Masaryk, founder of modern Czechoslovakia. "It is too bad he is not alive. He would be a great fighter for this idea of preserving national culture."

Jan Masaryk agreed. Then Lemkin begged him to approach the Russians. "Tell Vishinsky," he urged, "that *some* good things come from the West. For example, tell him that penicillin is not an intrigue against the Soviet Union, and neither is this resolution against genocide."

What Masaryk told Vishinsky, Lemkin doesn't know, but nobody in the Soviet bloc openly opposed the resolution. On December 11, 1946, the General Assembly of the UN unanimously resolved that genocide was an international crime and that a treaty should be drawn up against it.

The exhausted shepherd returned to his little room, pulled down the shades, and didn't get out of bed for two days.

Back in Washington, Lemkin felt that until the convention had been drawn up, passed by the General Assembly, and ratified by the nations, there would be many opportunities to smother it. He quit the War Department and returned to New York.

Then in May, 1947, Trygve Lie suggested Lemkin might like to help draft the treaty. Lemkin began seeking group support for the genocide convention. American organizations backing the treaty that finally emerged include Catholic, Protestant and Jewish bodies, the AFL and the CIO, women's organizations and national groups.

Lemkin's fears that the baby might be smothered before it could walk were almost realized in 1947. He helped draft a genocide treaty, which then went to the UN's Codification Committee, then to the General Assembly. But a move developed to have the Assembly call the whole business premature. It was led by Russia and, to a lesser extent, by Great Britain, which was then still involved in India and Palestine.

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The morning the issue was to come to a vote, Oswaldo Aranha of Brazil, then president of the Assembly, found a grim-faced Lemkin waiting for him.

"Mr. President," said Lemkin, "who is making international law for the world—Vishinsky or the General Assembly? I ask this now because in 12 minutes you will begin presiding over a meeting which may decide to destroy the genocide convention by postponing it indefinitely. I appeal to you to hold off the vote."

Aranha held it off. Meanwhile, Lemkin lined up sponsors for a substitute resolution directing that a genocide treaty be submitted for action in 1948. Passed with 38 votes out of 54, it kept the baby alive another year.

Job Did Not Retard Crusade

A few months later, Yale invited Lemkin to join its law-school staff, lecturing on foreign exchange and on the law of the United Nations. Penniless by now, Lemkin accepted only on one condition—that he be permitted to give the genocide fight priority over teaching. Yale agreed, giving him a light lecture schedule and supplying him with research assistance and secretarial facilities for his crusade.

He took a \$5-a-week room in New Haven and spent the winter and spring of '48 there, teaching and working on a book, *The History of Genocide*. In the summer he flew to Geneva, where the UN's Economic and Social Council was considering the treaty. Then he went on to Paris for meetings of the General Assembly.

In Europe he faced a new hurdle. Some persons, both in and out of the UN, wanted to add the genocide convention to the one on human rights. Lemkin foresaw that this would create confusion and delay, so he argued that while human rights—to talk freely, to worship, to vote, go to school, not be discriminated against—were highly important, they were not life itself. "First we make existence safe," he would plead. "Then we work to improve it."

When the treaty was presented to the General Assembly in December, 1948, it represented a victory not only for the one-man crusader but also for an American delegate named John Maktos, an assistant legal adviser with the State Department.

Maktos had been chairman of a seven-nation committee which redrafted the genocide treaty and American member of the Legal Committee, where all the nations argued about it. He had skillfully fought attempts to sidetrack and weaken the treaty.

The Soviet bloc, for instance, had wanted the preamble to identify genocide as a Nazi and Fascist crime. Instead, it states that "at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity."

Political Groups Excepted

However, Maktos and Lemkin did make one big concession. They had intended the treaty to apply to genocidal acts against political—as well as against national, racial, cultural and religious—groups. The Russians objected, doubtless remembering what had happened to certain political groups in their country—and they were joined by some Latin-American delegates.

"On our continent," one of the South American leaders argued, "we are always having a revolution: then we dance a rumba and forget it. But if this treaty includes political groups, the loser of the revolution can claim before the world that the winner violated the genocide pact and must be punished."

Lemkin now proved himself intensely practical. He asked Maktos, "Is it better to get everything we want and then have it ratified by only a few countries, or to compromise and get most of the world behind us?"

Maktos laid the question before the full American delegation, including Secretary of State Marshall. They agreed that "political groups" should be withdrawn.

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On the afternoon of December 9, 1948, Lemkin's crusade, then fifteen years old, reached its first climax when the genocide convention finally came to a vote in the UN General Assembly in Paris at the Palais Chaillot.

Nervously Lemkin stood on the floor of the Assembly as the roll was called. One by one he heard the nations of the world vote yes. The count was 55 to 0.

Delegates rushed up to shake his hand. The French Foreign Minister thanked him in the name of France. Dr. Herbert Evatt of Australia, the Assembly president, congratulated him. Lowell Thomas referred to him on the radio as "the happiest man in Paris."

He was probably also the weariest. He spent two days rounding up signatures to the treaty (43 nations eventually signed); then once again he entered the American Military Hospital, this time for six weeks.

Today Lemkin is still weary and ill, his blood pressure still high. For after the Assembly's approval, he set himself the not inconsiderable task of seeing to it that the treaty was made effective by the formal ratification of at least 20 nations. Since October 14th, when the number of formal ratifications passed that figure and the protocol was signed, more nations have ratified, a total of 28 in all: five with reservations, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Philippines; 23 without reservations, Australia, Norway, Iceland, Liberia, Costa Rica, Haiti, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Ceylon, France, Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Yugoslavia, Ecuador, Panama, Guatemala and six non-UN members, Korea, Monaco, Cambodia, Viet-Nam, Laos and Jordan. Four more UN members—Brazil, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Iran—are expected to ratify soon.

President Truman transmitted the convention to the Senate in June, 1949, with a message strongly urging its approval. But a few months later the powerful American Bar Association went on record as opposed. Its spokesmen at public hearings of a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations made clear that it was not against a genocide convention, just against this particular convention.

ABA arguments—and answers by Lemkin and State Department officials—ran like this:

1. The convention is too weak because it omits "political groups."

Still, said the treaty's proponents, most cases of genocide—even by that archgenocidist, Hitler—have been committed against racial, religious, cultural or national groups rather than purely political ones.

2. It is also too weak because it doesn't define genocide as a crime committed "with the complicity of government."

But Article IV of the convention clearly states that genocidists shall be punished "whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals."

3. At the same time, the convention is too strong because it says anyone shall be punished who commits genocide against a group "in whole or in part." Doesn't that mean that if even one Negro is killed, the U.S. can be accused of genocide?

Nonsense, say those who wrote the treaty: if Smith kills a Negro because Smith is drunk, or angry, or insulted, that's homicide. It is genocide only if a substantial number of Negroes are killed as part of a plan to exterminate all the Negroes in America.

4. Furthermore, it violates State rights because it imposes domestic law by the treaty method.

But Article V states plainly that countries shall enact legislation against genocide *in accordance with their respective constitutions*.

5. Finally, the treaty is too strong because someday it may make it possible for an American citizen to be tried before an international court for a crime committed

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in his own country. That would be unconstitutional.

Treaty backers point to Article VI, which provides that a person shall be tried in the country where the crime was committed—"or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to such contracting parties [nations] as shall have accepted the jurisdiction of such tribunal."

Problems of a Trial Court

There is now no international criminal court for dealing with genocide cases, but the UN is considering whether or not there should be one. It may recommend either that a new court be set up or that the present International Court of Justice be used. In either case, the court could not act unless the country concerned had accepted its jurisdiction.

The question most often put to Lemkin concerns the treaty's practicality. For instance, what if Russia commits genocide? Is it realistic to suppose she will try the responsible officials in her own courts? Can we even hope she will accept an international court?

"Even Russia," says Lemkin, "has some regard for public opinion. For instance, she's been advertising herself as a protector of the rights of colonial peoples. Now if it should come out that she is not a protector but a destroyer of peoples, she would certainly have a harder time penetrating those areas in Asia and Africa she has her eyes on."

How much has his crusade cost Lemkin personally? The question surprised him: he had never thought of it that way. "All I know is that everything I have made has gone into it, and then some."

No man to rest on his laurels, Lemkin plans to continue to fight for universal ratification of the treaty. When this is achieved he hopes then to retire to the country for a while, do some fishing, play some checkers, and take up again—for the first time in years—painting in water colors.

But he adds: "I am hoping also to continue my study of genocide and to bring cases of it before the United Nations." In what capacity would he do that? "In the capacity of a human being," he declares. "I consider this treaty an epitaph to my mother. I want to keep it bright." **THE END**

Collier's

March 3, 1951