

Pathfinder

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Defeat of Communism



Casualty in Berlin. Run down by "gallant Russian allies" in a speeding truck.

Peace?

A few pistol shots in the night, the wail of a military police siren, a Russian or an American soldier found dead in a Berlin gutter. . . .

Or, as some G. I.'s still remember, morning might bring the sight of a bloody field jacket bearing an 82nd Airborne or 2nd Armored patch, floating empty in the Spree river where it crosses Potsdamer Strasse, dividing line between Russian and U.S. zones of Berlin.

In Greece, 15,145 British and American-trained and supplied soldiers have died in battles which also have taken the lives of 82,000 Russian-trained, Russian-supplied guerillas.

In China the casualties are uncounted. They may exceed 2½ million. But, in the fighting, the American flag has been used freely and deliberately as a boot-wiper for Russian-trained troops battling American-trained troops.

Officially, in the policy of the United States Government, this state of affairs is called peace.

Among people who disagree, who think the world struggle is a hot, not a cold war, few men are better qualified to explain why than a tall, soft-spoken author and political historian named James Burnham. At 44, Burnham is far and away the most articulate spokesman for an American policy aimed powerfully and proudly at one objective: destruction of Soviet power and a peace forged firmly on America's terms.

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Next Chapter. Three years ago Burnham outlined the need for such policy in a detailed study of Russia's one-track drive to domination of the earth, *The Struggle for the World*.

This month, in another book, entitled *The Coming Defeat of Communism* (John Day, New York: \$3.50), Burnham performs the more urgently needed service of explaining "how" Russia's conquest train may be derailed, permanently.

First, and most important, we must discard the cold war philosophy that has led to a defensive policy of "containing" Russia rather than the aggressive goal of defeating her. Not only is this the sole hope for the future freedom of Americans. It is the only hope of all those Russians—of people everywhere—who have a will to remain free.

Even as Burnham's book headed toward the bookstalls this week, the Russian propaganda mill had spread its coincident rebuttal. This was voiced by Peter N. Pospelov, editor of *Pravda*. It is now, he said, too late to stop the forceful march of communism.

Later this month, of course, *Pravda* would probably condemn Burnham as an imperialistic warmonger. In New York, the Communist paper, *Daily Worker*, last week had already started to do exactly that.

In all the frothings about Burnham and his "imperialism," however, there is one difficulty which probably plagues Russian propagandists. To identify Burnham personally with his writing is difficult. Even the most skillful Moscow cartoonist would have trouble caricaturing him as a bloody-handed warrior.

They should have little difficulty, however, in assuming, quite correctly, that beyond Burnham's round, mildly-featured face and his precise, almost prim gestures and voice there is a steel-hard core of familiarity with Communist tactics and an equally tough determination to fight them.

Ex-Insider. Much of the familiarity and the contempt it bred was formed during seven years of hectic allegiance to radical, although anti-Stalinist causes. In 1933, four years after Burnham, a Chicago-born Princeton graduate, began teaching philosophy classes at New York University, he joined the ranks of Leon Trotsky's Fourth International, pledged to oust Stalin and restore "real socialism" to Russia.

By 1940 he was ready to end his increasingly bitter arguments with Trotsky by breaking not only with communism but with the entire radical tradition that fostered it. "The basic reason for the break," he has said, "was my conclusion that Marxism is false, and that Marxist politics in practice lead not to their alleged goal of democratic socialism but to one or another form of totalitarian despotism." Even socialism, he concluded, holds only false hopes.

Later, in *The Managerial Revolution*, the book he considers his most important, he pessimistically concluded that the trend of the times is nevertheless toward efficient but ruthless control of economy by technicians and managers.

In America he saw its pattern in the New Deal, "whose historical direction . . . as a whole runs entirely counter to the ideals and aims of liberalism."

Today Burnham is officially on leave

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from his New York University teaching post with the self-imposed assignment of doing "research" in the nation's capital. Actually, this ranges from long hours of studying Government documents to sessions with anti-Communist leaders from all over the world and to unofficial "lobbying" for strengthened U.S. policy wherever and whenever such questions are being considered.

Reflected strongly in the Washington affairs, Burnham now observes, is the inability, thus far, of America's diplomats to out-point Russia's.

Always Loser. No matter what other reports there may be of Yalta or Potsdam or any other diplomatic meetings with Russia, Burnham says that "the aftermath never shows a net gain for us, and always shows at least some gain—ranging from a factory or a ship to entire nations—for the enemy."

One example of the diplomatic revaluations Burnham feels are necessary: ". . . the North Atlantic Pact is itself a doubtful device. It, too, is an expression of the containment policy. It does not say to the Communists, 'Go back,' but only, and not very loudly, 'Come no further (in Europe).'"

Instead, he thinks, we should first make clear that U.S. policy will be dedicated to the eventual restoration of European unity by driving Russia's invading forces out. And in Asia we could redeem ourselves with firmness on Formosa.

Result of this would be to provide the spark many of our potential allies now lack—the will to fight for national survival. Without this will, guns and Marshall Plan dollars are useless.

Even U.S. policy in the United Nations, Burnham charges, presents only a spectacle of incompetence for Europeans who are slowly losing hope of American leadership in the struggle for the world. "We temper and restrict our criticisms, seldom even referring to the most important matters, because we wish to 'reduce tension' and 'avoid provocation.'"

Where will polite efforts toward agreement with Russia lead? Burnham answers, "to defeat!" and, probably, to a world-wide rather than a localized shooting war.

As Burnham explains it, "No genuine agreement or alliance between Communists and non-Communists ever takes place or is possible. Agreements and alliances with non-Communists are defined by Communist doctrine as devices for 'utilizing divisions within the camp of the enemy.'" And divisions, in this case, can mean both divided political factions and actual fifth-column divisions now shielded by a "liberal disturbance" over every strong measure taken against Communists.

No Counterattack. Although Communists have proven the worth of fifth-column, political subversive warfare, America has failed to follow suit. Burnham considers adoption of these tactics for our own purposes as a necessity.

Aid, both physical and propaganda-wise, to all those forces behind the Iron Curtain which retain love of freedom, is an important item in the coming defeat Burnham plans for communism.

Knowledge that they are not alone in the *fight against* (as contrasted to the *containment of*) communism would spark martial resistance in the Balkans, Eastern

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Germany, Poland, the rapidly crumbling Far East and even Russia.

But if we are to demonstrate that sort of leadership, we must shed the fear of provoking Russia into attack.

Burnham's attitude toward the fear of provocation is quite direct: "It would be absurd to hold that all risk of a Soviet armed attack can be eliminated. There is such a risk, of course—no matter what policy and plan we adopt or fail to adopt. That risk, however slight, must always be allowed for. It is not intelligently allowed for by predicting the activation of military forces on some distinctly marked D-day that may well never occur. Rather, the United States must be continuously ready to commit whatever military force is required by the development of its own plans and the given situation."

Burnham's timetable is that "for two or three years we are free to act in almost any way we choose in relation to the Soviet Union and to communism without a serious risk of total armed conflict, and with no risk of military defeat." When the Soviet has an ample A-bomb stockpile, however, Burnham thinks the balance will shift—total war becoming inevitable and defeat possible.



Mr. and Mrs. Burnham. *One of the people they met was a slumbering giant.*

Basis for present military optimism is Burnham's well-informed belief that Red propaganda had caused most Americans to overestimate the Red army. Its record, Burnham points out, is bad. In 1940 it was deflated by the bayonets of tiny Finland. Hitler's errors and U.S. supplies were major strength sources even when it fought against Germany.

And, Burnham insists, the "relative weakness of the Soviet economy and the Soviet culture must necessarily be reflected in the Soviet army."



Answer to a challenge. *An airlift may by-pass a blockade but, in Burnham's book an armed convoy would lift it.*

Opportunism. A good example of how Burnham would have us exploit these Soviet weaknesses is in his comment on the Berlin airlift:

“. . . the airlift was not a decision; or, if a decision, it was a decision not to decide. It was a means of temporizing, for putting off decisions. After it turned out to be a great technical success, and had excited the admiration of the world, it could of course be advertised as a brilliant victory. But a victory means the achievement of a goal. And what was the goal?”

Burnham's answer: There was none. If the goal of Communist defeat had been in mind we would have sent “armed convoys through with supplies.” He supports his thesis by saying that it “is widely believed that General Clay, then military governor for the United States, was in favor of this . . . decision.”

But, critics are bound to shout, “We can't just be ‘against communism.’ We have to provide a ‘better answer.’”

For & Against. Burnham has come to the conclusion “that this opinion (is) in considerable measure a by-product of successful Communist propaganda.

“We cannot counter this totalitarian ideology with ‘our own’ ideology of the same order. . . . We will never get, and we ought not want, any such ‘answer.’”

“It is not true, in the second place, that a war or social struggle can be successful only if . . . ‘positive’ in form. The contrary is more often true. In general human beings understand much more clearly what they are *against* than what they are for . . .

“What we are against is ordinarily something limited, concrete. . . . What we are for is something . . . compounded, by desire more than knowledge, out of the unlimited possibilities of an imagined future. . . .

“We are for the restraint of power by custom, moral principle, and by law. We believe individual human beings to be of an infinitely higher moral worth than any secular end or goal. We believe in an open, not a closed society, in the right . . . to be different. . . .

“We are for the right of men not to be snatched from bed at three in the morning by the agents of an uncontrolled secret police.

“We have no reason to feel inferior about the potential of our propaganda, or its ability to move men into action.”

In Washington and New York, however, Burnham is continually running into people who loudly proclaim that such

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issues as racial segregation at home are more important than the very real war with communism everywhere. Solve such problems, they say, and people will flock to our side rather than to Russia's.

Burnham comes close to losing his usual air of professorial calm with such people. The idea of regarding Russia's slave state as an alternative to present-day America is to him a sign of vast silliness or party line parroting. That men will ever live in a 100% perfect society, he feels, is at this juncture doubtful. The art of modern life, as it has been in the past, is to learn to live in a world which is never all right or all wrong, but always bouncing back and forth somewhere between the two.

Seeds of Revolt? His indictment of Russia, for instance, is not a charge of "all wrong." There are, he has concluded after ample travel, and contacts with refugees from behind the Iron Curtain, millions of Russians upon whom we can count to revolt if they are ever provided proper leadership.

Paradoxically, that leadership today mainly must come from the élite of the Soviet Communist party itself. Only they have home radio receivers capable of receiving U.S. broadcasts. They also possess the training, in large numbers, to lead a coup d'état against the Kremlin.

But their faith in Stalinism cannot be shaken, nor their party-doctrine shells even cracked, by a Voice of America broadcasting dance music, or programs on the latest U.S. fashions (subtly supposed to undermine Communists with jealousy).

What might crack the shells behind the Curtain is a running exposé of the facts of Soviet tyranny as opposed to its professed freedom, plus a repeated and deadly serious reminder that "we are ready to settle without war. Here are our demands. Meet them, and you may live."

The necessary nature of these demands, Burnham feels, has been so obscured by present U.S. policy that we couldn't discuss terms even if Stalin flew to Washington tomorrow with an offer of immediate surrender. They *should* be: "1. The liquidation [in fact] of the Communist fifth column. . . . 2. The cessation of Soviet-directed propaganda. . . . 3. The total withdrawal of the personnel of the Red army—uniformed or undercover, the MVD [secret police], and all other related Soviet organizations, from all territory outside the pre-1939 Soviet borders. . . .

"4. A free choice of government, after suitable preparation [return of exiles, supervision of elections], by the peoples of all the territories and nations which have been submitted to *de facto* Soviet control since 1939.

"5. A sufficient modification of the internal Soviet structure to guard the world against its secret and irresponsible militarization."

That America is the only force on earth strong enough to impose those conditions seems an obvious fact of power-politics to Burnham.

Remote Control. One of the greatest drains of American strength today, according to Burnham's most bitter chapter, is "how easily the Kremlin propaganda directors can pull the stops of American public opinion and the American press."

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Another weakness is that so many businessmen "are ignorant, abysmally ignorant, about what communism is, what Communists are. . . . They really cannot believe that the Communists mean what they say. . . . They cannot comprehend the certainty that, if the Communists conquer, they themselves . . . will be shot like cattle, or driven to die more slowly and terribly. . . ."

Why Burnham vented such special ire on businessmen is implicit throughout the book: He feels that largely upon their proven ingenuity rests the success of the battle.

That the strength is there and victory inevitable, however, Burnham has not doubted since 1948-49. For 20,000 miles, then, back and forth across the length of the nation, he and his family* saw America close-up, away from their usual East Coast insulation.

They made the trip in a 1947 Pontiac station wagon. They slept out, in sleeping bags, much of the time. They talked to everyone they met. They all learned something.

An Easterner, knowing Europe better than America, Burnham saw things in his own colossal country that he'd never seen before: ". . . a factory in Detroit, an oil well in Texas . . . a grain field in the Big Bend . . . ore ships crowding the Sault . . . steel mills at Gary. . ."

"The United States," he learned, "is not, not by centuries, ready to quit. . . . The will to exist and to advance is powerfully there, though for the moment in partial suspension."

Days of Decision. This particular moment in our history, Burnham feels, is "the tormenting pause before the leap into maturity."

*His wife, the former Marcia Lightner of St. Paul, and children: John, 6, James Bernard, 10, and Marcia, 13. Also along on the trip: an 80-pound Doberman Pinscher named Jude.