

## 'WHY WE LOST"

There is a strange, Alice-in-Wonderland quality to many things that happen in this confused era of an un-tranquil peace. None stranger, to our mind, was the fact that, a fortnight ago, as Philadelphians sipped their morning coffee and glanced at their morning paper, they were able to read a dispatch in the Philadelphia Inquirer, proudly by-lined by Foreign Correspondent Hermann Goering. The Goering article ran for three long columns and was headlined "Why We Lost." It was serviced to the Inquirer as well as to other papers by one of the nation's largest wire services which obtained exclusive rights for the journalistic endeavor of Goering, Keitel and Raeder, whose dispatches appeared on successive days.

Apart from clearing up the mystery of what these worthy warriors do during their leisure moments in Nurnberg, all three stories reiterate the now-familiar Nazi theme "We were not to blame," and emphasize the element of bad luck involved in Germany's defeat. Startling though it may have been, publication of these articles in the American press is doubtless of some value to those who have become bored with lengthy reports of the Nurnberg testimony itself. Here, in a few columns, are the clumsy self-exonerations of three of Germany's most outstanding war criminals, from their prison cells, who still attempt to persuade the world that their guilt was nominal and accidental.

Of the three articles, the most amazing is that of Goering, who writes blandly: "Germany missed three opportunities to win the war, a diplomatic one, a military one, and a technical one." He goes on to explain that the diplomatic blunder was caused by Hitler's refusal to negotiate peace with France and Britain in the beginning of 1940, despite his (Goering's) repeated and self-less attempts to avert war. The onus for the military mistake is shared by Hitler and Field Marshal von Brauchitsch alike. Hitler was responsible, writes analyst Goering, for the onslaught against Russia, while von Brauchitsch committed the heinous, tactical error which led to the Russian counter-attack. The technical opportunity missed, according to Goering, was the unforgivable delay in mass production of the German jet fighter. This was entirely Hitler's fault, and turned out to be a "fatal" error. Goering sums up his review of these series of misfortunes, with a colossal stroke of arrogance, and informs his American public that "These . . . three great opportunities we missed . . . might have brought us victory. I hope others will draw their lessons from our experience." It would not be surprising, also, if "others" would

draw their lessons from the well-nigh unbelievable fact that, while on trial for their lives, Hermann Goering and two of his colleagues, are permitted to perpetuate the myth that Germany lost the war due to bad luck alone, rather than due to the overwhelming military and political odds against her-and that they are free to utilize the pages of the American press for this dubious purpose.

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